





Is the indiscriminate detention of irregular migrants 
a cost-effective policy tool?  A case-study of the 
Amygdaleza Pre-Removal Center* 
by Danai Angeli, Anna Triandafyllidou 
 
The Opening of Amygdaleza Pre-Removal Centre 
On 28 April 2012 the pre-removal center of Amygdaleza (‘Amygdaleza’) opened its doors as Greece’s 
first purpose-built camp for the detention of irregular migrants. Located at the foot of Parnitha 
mountain in a green landscape of around 30,000m2, surrounded by a wired fence and equipped with 
250 containers — the same ones that had been used to accommodate earthquake survivors in the past 
— Amygdaleza promises to its 2,000 detainees “exemplary” facilities and “living conditions fully 
consistent with human value”.1 With daily cleaning services, food catering of high quality, access to 
an open yard, stand-by counseling and medical staff Amygdaleza sets — at least on paper — 
uncommonly high standards for a country that has been publicly condemned by the CPT for its 
detention facilities.2  
 
The Greek Government has explained that reasons of broader public interest dictated the immediate 
commencement of the operation of such a facility. “The significantly low return rate, due to 
difficulties and delays in the issuance of the necessary travel documents” had hampered Greece's 
effort to implement an effective asylum and migration policy and successfully safeguard the EU 
external borders. There was thus a compelling need for “increased capacity in pre- removal 
centres”.3 In the future, similar centres are going to be established elsewhere in the country, 
depending on migration flows. Their establishment forms part of the National Action plan on 
                                                 
*   Special thanks go to Dr. Angeliki Dimitriadi for her critical comments on an earlier version 
of this policy paper and for her contribution to the final editing. 
1 See Communication from Greece concerning the case of M.S.S. against Belgium and Greece 
(Application No. 30696/09), Memorandum DH-DD(2012)1157, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instra
netImage=2204818&SecMode=1&DocId=1964830&Usage=2 . 
2 See European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, “Public Statement concerning Greece”, 15 March 2011, available at 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/grc/2011-10-inf-eng.htm . 
3 See Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection, “Greek Action Plan on Asylum and 
Migration Management, Executive Summary Progress Report January- May 2013”, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/p4_progressreport
_/p4_progressreport_en.pdf ; see also Statement of Minister of Public Order and Citizen 
Protection of Greece,  101st Session of the IOM Council, Geneva, 27 November 2012, “Greek 
Policies on Migration and Asylum and the strategic cooperation with the International 
Organisation for Migration” available at http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/About-
IOM/governing-bodies/en/council/101/Nikolaos-Dendias-Greek-Minister-of-Public-Order-and-
Citizen-Protection.pdf . 
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Migration and Asylum Management which has been approved by the European Commission.4 “Our aim 
 is that every illegal migrant, unless the competent authorities decide that he is entitled to 
international protection, will be detained until he is returned to his home country”.5  
The new detention policy 
Greece has adopted since 2010 a new policy to manage its irregular migrant population and reinforce 
the EU external borders, which relies heavily on the use of detention.6 Under this new action plan all 
migrants detected for irregular entry or residence in Greece, including asylum seekers, are 
systematically placed in detention — a direct consequence of their irregular status. Combined with 
wide-scale police operations this practice has led to the widespread detention of undocumented 
migrants throughout the country. In support of this new policy, a recent advisory opinion of the Greek 
Legal Council gave the green light to the authorities to prolong detention even beyond the maximum 
18-month time-limit set by the EU Returns Directive; until the detainee has “consented” to be 
returned.7  
 
Since the number of arrestees exceeds the number of places available to implement this new policy, 
Greece has engaged in the past three years in a large-scale investment in detention establishments. 
There are at present five (5) pre-removal centres operating in Amygdaleza, Corinth, Komotini, 
Paranesti and Xanthi, with a total capacity of 5,000 places. Four (4) additional facilities are currently 
under construction will increase the total capacity to 10.000 places by the end of 2014.8 
 
At the same time, Greece has heavily invested in improving the conditions inside old and new 
establishments. Some of the worst old facilities have closed down, others are being refurbished, 
while new establishments are being created — like Amygdaleza — “of high standards”9. An “Internal 
Regulation of Operation of the Security Services of Immigration Detention Facilities” that was 
recently prepared, seeks to establish for the first time a common framework of operation of these 
centers as well as set rules with regard to the behaviour of the staff and the rights and duties of the 
                                                 
4 See Communication from Greece concerning the case of M.S.S. against Belgium and Greece 
(Application No. 30696/09), Memorandum DH-DD(2012)1157, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instra
netImage=2204818&SecMode=1&DocId=1964830&Usage=2 . 
5 See Press Office Reply of Minister of Interior and Citizen Protection concerning the events at 
Amygdaleza, 11 August 2013, available at  
http://www.yptp.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=GR&perform=view&id=4736&Itemid
=579 (Translation by the author of Greek original: “Στόχος μας είναι κάθε παράνομος 
μετανάστης, εφόσον τα αρμόδια όργανα κρίνουν ότι δεν δικαιούται διεθνούς προστασίας, να 
κρατείται μέχρι να επιστρέψει στην πατρίδα του.”) . 
6 See Report by Council of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
“Migration and asylum: mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean”, 23 January 2013, 
available at http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19349&Language=en . 
7 For more see A. Triandafyllidou, A. Dimitriadi and D. Angeli, “Detention as Punishment: Can 
indefinite detention be Greece's main policy tool to manage its irregular migrant population?”, 
MIDAS Policy Brief, April 2014, available at http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Polic-brief-Detention-in-Greece-1.pdf . 
8 See Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection, “Greek Action Plan on Asylum and 
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detainees. 10 
 
The purpose of this new policy is straightforward: to secure that all irregular migrants — unless 
granted international protection — will be returned to their home countries. Faced with the 
deprivation of their liberty and without the hope of a timely release, the Greek authorities believe 
that migrants will be forced to co-operate and accept a so called “voluntary” [assisted] return or 
indeed a forced return to their country of origin. Greece will thus succeed in reducing the overall size 
of its irregular migrant population. At the same, this new policy is expected to act as a deterrent 
since it will “send a strong signal to third-country nationals willing to illegally enter Greece,” and 
“warn all immigrants who do not fall under the status of international protection that they will be 
arrested, detained and returned to the countries of origin”.11 
 
Greece's decision to manage irregular migration by using indiscriminate and lengthy detention as the 
predominant policy tool is not pioneering; past similar efforts however have shown that mass and 
lengthy detention is a very costly enterprise and does not guarantee better results than its less costly 
alternatives.12 Unsurprisingly, in the last three years crisis-stricken Greece has repeatedly appealed 
to the other Member States for solidarity and financial support. The EU has so far agreed to co-fund 
this latest policy experiment without challenging Greece's position, which is under pressure to deal 
with a sharply decreasing but still noticeable volume of irregular arrivals (as counted by the related 
apprehensions at the country’s sea and land borders with Turkey). 
 
Table 1: Greek-Turkish border apprehensions: 2008-2013 
 
Border areas 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 
Land Border 14,461 8,787 47,088 54,974 30,433 585 
Sea Border 30,149 27,685 6,204 1,030 3,651 5,579 
Total Apprehensions 44,610 36,472 52,269 56,004 34,084 6,834 
Source: Ministry of Public Order & Citizen Protection, (2012). * Data for Jan-Aug 2013. 
 
 It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the overall policies of Greece in combating irregular 
migration (see for instance Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011) for a critical perspective13. We would 
like however to cast light here to an aspect of Greece’s irregular migration policy that has been 
under-researched; notably the costs and effectiveness of detention, thus contributing to assessing the 
                                                 
10 See National Gazette, Issue No 1851 of 29 July 2013, available at 
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/b4/My%20Documents/Downloads/document%20(2).p
df . 
11 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Mission to Greece, 18 
April 2013, p. 11, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx . 
12 See International Detention Coalition and La Trobe Refugee Research Centre Report “There are 
alternatives: a handbook for preventing unnecessary immigration detention”, 2011, available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/Events/IDC.pdf ; See Report by Council 
of Europe Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, “Migration and asylum: 
mounting tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean”, 23 January 2013,  available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19349&Language=en ; see UNHCR 
Guidelines on the applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum-seekers  
and alternatives to detention, 2012, available at http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html . 
13 See A, Triandafyllidou and M. Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration Control in Italy and Greece: stong 
fencing and weak gate-keeping serving the labour market”, European Journal of Migration and 
Law (2011), Vol. 13, pp. 251- 273. 
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effectiveness of this  migration control measure. It is our contention that investing heavily in a policy 
with no proven effectiveness, a huge financial cost and an equally high human rights cost is, at best, 
an ill-advised decision.  Alternatives that are less costly and more effective do exist and Greece must 
explore them, before plunging further into this venture. This is, after all, prescribed by the Returns 
Directive, that requires States to inscribe alternatives to detention in their national legislation. 
Counting already two years of operation, the pre-removal center Amygdaleza — a direct product of 
this new practice — offers an appropriate first basis to demonstrate the financial non-sustainability of 
this policy and evaluate its cost-effectiveness. 
The 'high' standards of Amygdaleza.   
Highly publicised before it had even opened, Amygdaleza pre-removal centre has become by now 
Greece's largest detention facility. With a record capacity of 2,000 places, it is a massive facility that 
hosts primarily adult men, both irregular migrants and asylum seekers. The average detention time is 
4-5 months, since it is primarily used as a transit center among the different detention facilities. 
Impressively large and with a very different layout than the rest of Greece's detention 
establishments, it is less of a center and more of a camp. The actual living conditions however inside 
the facility, admittedly better than the average Greek detention center, can hardly be characterised 
as 'high standards'; in fact Amygdaleza is quality-wise a rather modest facility that has faced some 
serious operational problems during its first two years of functioning.  
 
The camp comprises of 300 prefabricated containers spread around a field of 30,000m2 and divided 
along three sections (Section A', B' and C'). The 250 containers are being used for accommodation 
purposes. In the table below we outline the structure of the facility:  
 
Table 2.: Layout of Amygdaleza 
 
Accommodation Communal Areas 
Size 25-32m214  
A/C 
Heater 
Metallic Bunk Beds 
Wardrobe 
Plastic Chairs and Table 
 
     Laundry 
     Pray area 
     Yard 
Capacity 8 detainees 
 




Apart from security which is run by the police, all other services have been allocated to NGOs or are 
subcontracted private companies.  
Compared to other detention establishments in Greece, Amygdaleza provides undoubtedly better 
facilities. Even the mere fact that detainees have unobstructed access to a private bathroom is a 
significant improvement. However, being “relatively better” in a country with admittedly sub-
standard facilities does not render Amygdaleza either “exemplary as regards accommodation and 
security”15 or in compliance with international human rights standards. While the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT) still needs to publish its first impressions, it is doubtful whether Greece's 
“exemplary” facility will spare the country from one more conviction by the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
                                                 
14 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β4121-ΓΒΠ. 
15 See Communication from Greece concerning the case of M.S.S. against Belgium and Greece 
(Application No. 30696/09), Memorandum DH-DD(2012)1157, available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instra
netImage=2204818&SecMode=1&DocId=1964830&Usage=2.  
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The CPT standards 
1.  In accordance with the CPT guidelines, the minimum amount of space that must be allocated to a 
detainee in a shared facility is 4m2.16 The current distribution of eight (8) detainees per one 
container of 25-32m2 places Amygdaleza at the margin or below this threshold.Running a facility that 
is overcrowded generates by itself State liability under international human rights law.  
2.  The conditions in which irregular migrants are held must reflect the nature of their deprivation of 
liberty — which in the case of those held in Amygdaleza is not criminal.17 This entails amongst others 
the duty to secure that the premises create the impression of a non-carceral environment and with 
as few restrictions as possible: 
“Obviously, such centres should provide accommodation which is adequately- furnished, clean and 
in a good state of repair, and which offers sufficient living space for the numbers involved. [...] 
As regards regime activities, they should include outdoor exercise, access to a day room and to 
radio/television and newspapers/magazines, as well as other appropriate means of recreation 
(e.g. board games, table tennis). The longer the period for which persons are detained, the more 
developed should be the activities which are offered to them”.18 
 
The barbed wire, scarce plastic chairs and currently empty yard of Amygdaleza obviously do not live 
up to these standards either. 
3. Other problems that have hampered the smooth functioning of Amygdaleza and raise issues under 
the CPT standards include19: 
 
Condition of camp Emergency situations Other services with problems 
Lack of warm water Revolt by detainees  Daily cleaning 
A/C malfunctioning Outbreak of scabies Medical supplies/ 
access to doctor 
Insufficient Hygiene Hunger strike Legal aid/  
access to a lawyer 
Scarce clothing Suicide attempts 
 
                                                 
16 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Custodial and non-custodial measures: the 
Prison System”, 2006, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-
reform/cjat_eng/1_Prison_%20System.pdf p. 11, par. 4.2.1. 
17 See European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
punishment, “CPT standards”, CPT/Inf/E (2002)1 — Rev. 2013, available at 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/documents/eng-standards.pdf p. 65, par. 28. 
18 Ibid. par. 29. 
19 See Communication from NGOs (Amnesty International, The International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ) and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)) (18 and 22/02/13) and 
reply of the Greek authorities (27/02/13) in the case of M.S.S. against Belgium and Greece 
(Application No. 30696/09), Amnesty International's Submission, pp. 8-9 and Second Joint 
Submission of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and of the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), p. 8, February 2013,  available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instra
netImage=2242120&SecMode=1&DocId=1986544&Usage=2 available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instra
netImage=2242120&SecMode=1&DocId=1986544&Usage=2 ; see also Letter by “Medical 
Intervention”, dated 28 April 2014; See Report of the Greek Ombudsman available at 
http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/diapistwseis-stp-29-05-2013--2.pdf ; see also Prot. no. 
6634/1-356717 Reply of the Aliens Directorate to the Greek Ombudsman, dated 19 July 2013, 
available at http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/apanthsh-elas-19-07-13.pdf . 
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To sum up, while the authorities have admittedly gone into serious efforts to set up Amygdaleza, 
much needs to be done before Greece can safely claim to be acting in compliance with its 
international obligations.  
The cost of building and running Amygdaleza 
To finance the construction and operation of Amygdaleza, Greece drew funding from three European 
Funds (75% of total cost) along with its own budget (25% of total cost). The initial plan to cover the 
expenditures solely by the External Borders Fund together with the national budget proved 
unrealistic. Following the necessary reassurances by Greece about its commitment to effectively 
improve its detention conditions, the Commission approved to co-finance the construction and 
running costs of Amygdaleza also from the EU Return Fund.20 Additional services, such as counseling, 
medical services and legal aid, normally financed by the European Refugee Fund, were also covered 
at by the European Return Fund. 21In practice, however, NGOs and private donors have however been 
helping out also with their own resources to cover the needs of the detainees. 
 
Construction- Equipment 
Total Estimated Cost:  3,000,00022 
Known costs23 
Item Cost  Item Cost 
Topographic design of  
the camp24 
€15,006 Furniture (plastic  
tables and chairs)25 
€25,000 
Construction works26   €2,288,774 Metallic beds27 €73,800 
Isolation materials28 €56,575 Mattresses 29 €73,800 
Electrical supplies30 €51,578 
 
Had the construction required actual building rather than mere refurbishing and transport of pre-
fabricated containers, it is likely that the costs would have been higher. As far as operational costs 
are concerned, Amygdaleza appears to be running on roughly €10,500,000 per year. This budget 
covers the most basic needs of the detainees such as cleaning, catering, bills, some scarce clothing, 
hygiene products, while some recreation is foreseen in the future.   
                                                 




22 An initial sum approved by the External Borders Fund for the whole construction of 
Amygdaleza was of €1,867,505.13,  available at http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β4ΩΦΙ-ΕΒΟ. 
23        As published in www.diavgeia.gov.gr . 
24 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β4Γ9Ι-ΔΒ7 and http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β41ΑΙ-
8ΜΑ . 
25 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β49ΣΙ-ΡΝΗ . 
26 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/ΒΛΛΗΙ-Η22. An initial sum of €1,525,887.00 for 
construction works approved by the External Borders Fund was deemed insufficient.  
http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β41ΑΙ-ΨΨΕ. 
27 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β49ΣΙ-ΛΞ7 . 
28 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/ΒΕΝΝΙ-1ΔΒ . 
29 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β49ΣΙ-2ΞΙ . 
30 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/ΒΕΝΝΙ-ΟΜΥ . 
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Regular Services 
Items Monthly Cost  
(actual sums spent) 
Estimated Annual Cost 
(at full capacity) 
Food catering > €300,00031 €4,226,400 
Daily cleaning   €62,000 - 72,00032 €800,00033 
Security    450 policemen (8h shifts) 
   6 vans 
   15-20 administrative staff 
N/A 
€4,980,000*(author's estimation) 
*Calculated on the basis of the estimated annual costs in other pre-removal centres.34 
 
Food is calculated at a standard daily rate of €5,87 euros/per person. It is noteworthy that this rate 
has already been challenged before the European Court of Human Rights for being too little to 
adequately cover a detainee's daily nutrition needs.35 Nonetheless, at full capacity catering in 
Amygdaleza alone would cost 11,740€ per day.   
 
Known Additional costs 
Items Cost Items Cost 
Clothing36 €72,545  Blankets37  €146,370 38 
Personal Hygiene Items39 €107,624  Disinfection €74,250 40 
 
Added altogether, including bills, repair and maintenance costs, the current annual estimated cost of 
                                                 
31 For instance in April 2013 the cost was €284,753.7 http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/ΒΕΝ3Ι-
1ΣΦ , in May 2013 was €313,745.63 http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/ΒΕΖΚΙ-Τ0Σ, in June 2013 
was €308,773.74 http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/ΒΛ49Ι-3ΓΦ , in July 2013 was €301,072.30 
http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/ΒΛΩΞΙ-ΩΝΚ, in October 2013 was €336,808.86 
http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/ΒΛ19Ι-ΞΟ1. 
32 See http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/ΒΕΔ2Ι-ΦΑΒ ; 
http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/Β4ΓΗΙ-ΜΛΧ ; http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/Β4ΓΗΙ-
Ω11 ; http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/Β4ΣΥΙ-9ΡΤ ; 
http://et.diavgeia.gov.gr/f/all/ada/ΒΕΔ2Ι-Α56 ; http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/ΒΕΥΣΙ-0ΙΘ. 
33 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β45ΜΙ-ΙΗ0  . 
34       The annual estimated Cost for Security in three Pre-moval Centre is: Corinth (capacity 
1,000) € 5,273,520; Parenesti (600) € 4,415,040 ; Fylakio (370) € 2,422,140, available at 
http://www.astynomia.gr/images/stories/2013/prokirikseis13/22112013frourhsh.pdf. Security 
is currently operated by the Greek Police and its cost is absorbed by the salaries of the police 
officials, it is therefore not evident. There is planning however to sub-contract  security to a 
private company like in the other pre-removal centres.  
35 See ECtHR, Tabesh v. Greece, Appl. no. 8256/07, par. 24, 39, 40. 
36        The sum paid for clothing was equivalent to two (2) shirts, two (2) pieces of underwear, 
one (1) tracksuit, and one (1) pair of shoes per detainee.  
37        Of interest is the order on blankets, since two equally expensive orders were made; yet 
the second one bought 1,000 more blankets than the first one.  (see fn. 39 immediately below)  
38 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β49ΣΙ-ΜΤΙ (€73,062.00 for 3,000 blankets); 
http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β45ΣΙ-Ι7Ξ (€73,308.00 for 2,000 blankets).  
39        The thousand spent in hygiene and clothing have nonetheless proven insufficient to avert 
health risks to both staff and detainees. In August 2013 scabies broke out requiring a major 
cleaning operation. 
40 See http://static.diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/Β430Ι-ΟΥΕ . 
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running Amygdaleza reaches €10,500,000 per year, i.e. roughly €14 per person per day. This is a 1/3 
of what Italy pays to detain a migrant (€45 per day).41 In practice, the budget for Amygdaleza sum 
has proven hardly enough to cover round-the-clock the most basic needs of the 2,000 persons held on 
a daily basis under the exclusive control of the Greek State. 
Assessing the cost-effectiveness  
In accordance with Greece's National Action plan on Asylum and Migration Management, the main 
purpose of this recent detention policy is two-fold: first, with the exception of persons entitled to 
international protection, to increase the return rate of irregular migrants currently residing in Greece 
and second, to deter irregular arrivals in the long run. 42 
 
For the purposes of the present case-study, two sets of data were used to assess the cost-
effectiveness of this policy: first, the statistics that cover the whole period of Amygdaleza's operation 
as a pre-removal centre since its operation 28 April 2012; second, the statistics that reflect the 
situation in the camp on the day of the visit on 8 April 2014. These will be then evaluated against the 
above-described costs. 
 
All in all, 9,677 detainees have been registered since 28 April 2012. On the day of the visit on 8 April 
2014 the number of detainees was 1,715.43  
The overwhelming majority comes from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the day of the visit 
there were also a couple of Somalis, Syrians and Palestinians in detention. All three top nationalities 
can be deported.  
 
Since its opening, a total of 2,700 out of the 9,677 detainees was forcibly or voluntarily returned 
from within the facility (27,9%) and 2,220 detainees applied for asylum in Amygdaleza (22,9%). 
Overall 1,195 migrants had consented to be returned to their home countries (12,3%) and 767 
detainees had explicitly requested to be returned and were actually returned(7,9%).  
On the day of the visit on 8 April 2014, 586 had applied for asylum (34,1%) and 145 had agreed to be 
returned to their home countries (8,4%). 
 
In terms of effectiveness, the figures illustrate that in a period of two years the use of detention 
resulted in an average 27,9% return rate. Detention was purposeless for a 28,5% of detainees, since 
an application for international protection had been submitted, therefore resulting in a short-term 
suspension of the return procedures. Finally, detention did not achieve its purpose for 48,6%, because 
they were neither returned nor had their status been regularised.  
As far as consent is concerned, an average of 10% had — at an unknown time — agreed to be returned 
and 7,9% had volunteered to be returned and were actually returned. The figures leave open to what 
extent the 10% “agree” rate overlaps with the 7,9% “request” rate. The overall consent rate ranges 
thus between 10%- 17,9%, i.e. an average of 14%. The figures also leave open the question of whether 
the consent was a result of detention — as this new policy aspires to achieve — or the person had 
already consented and was placed in prolonged detention nonetheless. Looking at the wider picture, 
the annual figures of returns covering the period 2011-2013 show so far a dramatic increase in IOM 
voluntary returns, but are rather steady when it comes to forced returns. 44 In this sense, the overall 
consent rate among Amygdaleza's detainees is very low. 
                                                 
41 See Global Detention Project “Italy Detention Profile”, available at 
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/italy/introduction.html#c2423   
42 Supra fn.11. 
43 Data provided by Police during fieldwork visit on 8. April 2014  
44 Data provided by the Greek Police Headquarters.  
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As far as irregular arrivals are concerned, the sample of Amygdaleza is too small and too recent to 
allow an estimate on the long-term discouraging effect of detention. The police statistics show a 
decrease in the number of new arrivals in Greece during the period 2011-2013.45 However, it is too 
early to draw conclusions on how permanent this decline is going to be and to what extent it is the 
direct outcome of a short-lived new policy or related to a wide range of other parameters.46  
Overall, this leaves Amygdaleza with an effectiveness rate of 27,9% in returning migrants and a rough 
rate of 14% with regard to consent.  
 
There are two ways to assess the cost effectiveness of this policy. One is to look at the direct costs 
and compare them against the forthright results, in order to evaluate if this policy is good value for 
money. A second way is to take into account also the indirect costs involved in the implementation of 
this policy, which allows a wider contextual analysis. These are often hidden and their precise 
amount is not always easy to calculate. 
 a. Effectiveness v. Direct Costs 
Amygdaleza currently runs on a budget of €10,500,000 per year, which as analysed earlier is 
equivalent to a minimum of €14 per detainee per day. It has a proven success rate in returns of 
27,9%.  
The National Action Plan foresees the creation of 10,000 by the end of 2014, which means that 
Greece would end up paying 14euros/day x 10,000places = 140,000 euros/day when these centers are 
running at full capacity.  
Looking now at the wider picture, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Migrants, 
the population of irregular migrants currently residing in Greece is estimated at 470,000.47 If we 
adopt this figure, under Greece's new policy of indiscriminate detention, all 470,000 migrants would 
have to be detained at some point, in order to filter who stays and who leaves. The cost to carry out 
such a plan would be 470,000 x 14 euros = 6,580,000€ per day or 46,060,000€ per week or 
€197,400,000 per month until all 470,000 cases have been processed.  
Not only is such a policy financially unsustainable under the current funds, but also unjustifiable with 
a 27,9% success rate in returns through detention and an average of 14% consent rate.  
b. Effectiveness v. indirect costs 
Some of the indirect costs are:  
1. The additional medical costs to treat the adverse health effects of detention. It is widely accepted 
that detention as such — let alone under unhygienic conditions — has a negative impact on the 
physical and mental health of both staff and detainees. When these are transmissible, they tend to 
spread rapidly. The most common problems in Greek detention centers are skin diseases, respiratory 
infections, gastrointestinal disorders, musculoskeletal and dental problems. 48 Depression, stress and 
frustration leading to tensions and violence as well as suicidal thoughts are also evaluated as a direct 
                                                 
45 See above Table 1. 
46 On parameters which can influence the measurable size of the irregular migrant population 
see for e.g. http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/GREECE.pdf . 
47 Supra fn. 11, page 5, par. 9.  
48 See Medecins sans Frontieres, “Invisible Suffering: Prolonged and systematic detention of 
migrants and asylum seekers in substandard conditions in Greece”, April 2014, available at 
http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/invisible_suffering.pdf . 
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result of prolonged detention.49 The staff and detainees of Amygdaleza are not in any way immune to 
this. For instance, in April 2013, hundreds of detainees went on hunger strike and at least two suicide 
attempts were recorded; in August 2013 scabies broke out in the facilities; the same month 10 
policemen and many more detainees were injured as a result of riots inside the center. 50 Providing 
medical treatment in all these incidents meant additional expenditures, all of which were a direct 
result of detention itself. In the long-term, the adverse health effects of detention are likely to 
hamper the integration of the affected persons, resulting in additional financial losses for Greece. In 
the case of irregular migrants in particular, it must be borne in mind that a certain percentage of 
them may eventually be allowed to stay in Greece — whether through the asylum system or because 
they cannot be deported. It appears counter-productive for Greece to first place migrants in 
detention and then have to provide them with long-term financial and social support once released. 
Given that the affected persons — both irregular migrants and personnel — are in their majority 
otherwise young healthy people, Greece is in essence compromising its own workforce. 
2. The costs to cover the needs of families of the affected persons. When the breadwinner is in 
detention or in need of long-term treatment and unable to work, then the family will necessarily 
resort to social support to survive. This entails on the one hand additional costs for Greece because it 
has to assist the destitute family and on the other hand losses, because the economy loses in labour, 
consumption and taxes.  
3. Unnecessary expenditures. It is unnecessary to detain indiscriminately the irregular migrants that 
the authorities come across, in order to implement an effective migration and asylum policy. Such an 
approach results in unnecessary expenditures. Asylum-seekers for instance, cannot be deported for as 
long as their claims are being examined; paying for their detention during this period is an 
unnecessary expenditure, in particular because their case might be eventually approved. In such 
cases, detention was from the beginning purposeless. Likewise, detention should be an option of last 
resort for persons who have declared that they wish to be deported, since they will likely return. It 
could be argued that it is a waste of resources to pay for detention in advance especially knowing 
that the policy objective may not be fulfilled or will likely be fulfilled.  
4. Political and Financial Cost of Litigation. When a policy lacks in legality — as indiscriminate and 
prolonged detention of irregular migrants does — there is a high risk that the victim will resort to 
legal proceedings. Greece is well-familiar with this, having been repeatedly convicted by the 
European Court of Human Rights on the issue of detention. The average reimbursement in past 
convictions has ranged between 8,000 — 10,000€ per case. While only a handful of irregular migrants 
have so far sought recourse to the European Court of Human Rights, the convictions did cost to 
Greece primarily politically, but also financially.  
 
The problem with detention is that every time a State deprives a person from his/her freedom, it 
takes on the responsibility to cater for all of that person's needs. When this practice is carried out at 
a wide-scale, indiscriminately and for prolonged periods it becomes very costly and no longer a good 
value for the money invested; no matter how well resources have been managed. Detention 
therefore should not be Greece' main policy tool; it can only offer a limited and last resort solution 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 See for instance http://www.kathimerini.gr/34419/article/epikairothta/ellada/apopeira-
aytoktonias-dyo-apergwn-peinas-sto-kentro-metanastwn-sthn-amygdaleza ; 
http://www.kathimerini.gr/49912/article/epikairothta/ellada/se-kanonikoys-ry8moys-




  11 
when all other more cost-effective alternatives of a comprehensive strategy have been exhausted. 
Recommendations 
There are effective and less costly alternatives that Greece must explore before investing further in a 
policy with doubtful outcomes. Alternatives that have been successfully applied in other countries 
include: 51  
 Screening and assessment of individual cases: character-based evaluation can reduce the risk 
of unnecessary detention; detention is also needless when deportation cannot take place in the 
near future or the migrant has already consented to be returned to her/his home country. 
 Investment in early legal advice: irregular migrants, including asylum-seekers, often rely on 
false information provided by the smugglers. Early legal advice, preferably through personal 
contact with an assigned caseworker, can result in quicker and more durable decisions, resulting in 
overall savings 
 Expansion of alternative surveillance schemes: Less coercive measures, such as fines and 
reporting to police stations have been successfully applied and are more cost-effective in cases 
where there is no imminent prospect of return. 
 Investment in open accommodations: Asylum-seekers, families, vulnerable categories can be 
housed in open accommodations that are less costly, achieve higher standards and allow better 
integration of approved cases. 
 Expansion of return counseling programs: Information about return programs should be wider 
disseminated. Studies show that specific categories of persons that are more likely to agree to 
return to their home countries. (e.g. Families with children). 
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51 See International Detention Coalition and La Trobe Refugee Research Centre Report “There are 
alternatives: a handbook for preventing unnecessary immigration detention”, 2011, available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/Events/IDC.pdf ; see UNHCR Guidelines 
on the applicable criteria and standards relating to the detention of asylum-seekers and 
alternatives to detention, available at http://www.unhcr.org/505b10ee9.html . 
 
